



In deciding cases which arose under the due process clauses
the Supreme Court has at different times taken two positions con-
cerning the powers of government which are unquestionably in-
consistent with each other. According to one position the state
legislatures over subject-matters not withdrawn from their con-
trol, and Congress over subject-matter' entrusted to it, have all
governmental powers which are not entrusted by the constitutions
to other organs of government and which are not withdrawn from
the control of those legislative bodies by other provisions of the
oonstitutions. This position is supported by the vast weight of
direct authority. A number of the authorities were noted in a
former article,' and we shall soon note further authorities in its
support.
According to the other position, there are restraints which,
although not contained in the constitutions, apply to all organs of
government; there are rights which, although not supported by the
constitutions, no organ of government may violate; and those re-
straints, or those rights, are to be ascertained by judicial action.
That position is expressed in several ways, so that it will be neces-
sary for us to observe the decisions and dicta under several heads,
but there is the common thought which underlies those several
lines of cases that there are fundamental rights, inalienable lights,
which have an existence independent of any provision of the con-
stitutions but which the courts may recognize and may compel
all organs of government to observe. That thought furnishes the
real basis of some of the decisions in cases which arise under the
due process pr6vision.
As we have already said, those two positions are unquestion-
ably inconsistent with each other. And yet the court has given
* Copyright, 1913, by'Robert P. Reeder.
1 U. of Pa. L. Rev., Nov., i9o8, pp. 64, 65.
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such inadequate attention to their inconsistency that each position
has been expressed by the Supreme Court frequently, and in several
cases, of which Twining v. New Jersey
a may be cited as an in-
stance, the two positions are even stated side by side in the same
opinion.
2 (1908) 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14.
' See the quotation from the opinion in Twining v. New Jersey on p. 448,
infra. With it compare the following quotation from the same opinion: "We
prefer to rest our decision on broader grounds, and inquire whether the exemp-
tion from self-incrimination is of such nature that it must be included in the con-
ceptioin of due process. Is it a fundamental principle of liberty and justice
which inheres in the very idea of free government and is the inalienable right of a
citizen of such a government? If it is. and is of a nature that pertains to process
of law, this court has declared it to be essential to due process of law:" 211 U.
S. at xo6, 29 Sup. Ct. at 22. "Even if the historical meaning of due process of
law and the decisions of this court did not exclude the privilege from it, it would
be going far to rate it as an immutable principle of justice which is the inalienable
possession of every citizen of a free government. . . , It is at best defended
not as an unchangeable principle of universal justice, but as a law proved by
experience to be expedient:" 211 U. S. at 113, 29 Sup. Ct. at 25. "Consist-
ently with the requirements of due process, no change in ancient procedure can
be made which disregards those fundamental principles, to be ascertained from
time to time by judicial action, which have relation to process of law and protect
the citizen in his private right, and guard him against the arbitrary action of
government. This idea has been many times expressed in differing words by
this court, and it seems well to cite some expressions of it. The words due pro-
cess of law 'were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise
of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private
rights and distributive justice.' Bank of Columbia v. Okely, (1819) 4 Wheat.
235, 244 (approved in Hurtado v. California (1884), i1o U. S. 516, 527, 4 Sup.
Ct. I1, 292, 117; Leeper v. Texas, (189I) 139 U. S. 462, 468, Ix Sup. Ct. 577,
579; Scott v. McNeal, (1894) 154 U. S. 34, 45, 14 Sup. Ct. 1108, 1112). 'This.
court has never attempted to define with precision the words "due process of
law." . . . It is sufficient to say that there are are certain immutable prin-
ciples of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no mem-
ber of the Union may disregard.' Holden v. Hardy, (1898) 169 U. S. 366, 389,
18 Sup. Ct. 383, 387. 'The same words refer to that law of the land in each state,
which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the state.
exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.' In rc Kemmler•
(189o) 136 U. S. 436, 448, 10 Sup. Ct. 930, 934- 'The limit of the full control
which the state has in the proceedings of its courts, both in civil and criminal
cases, is subject only to the qualification that such procedure must not work a
denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions
of the Federal Constitution.' West v. Louisiana, (igo4) 194 U. S. 258, 263, 24
Sup. 65o, 652." See 211 U. S. at ox, 102,29 Sup. Ct. at 20,21.
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS
POWER TO DECLARE GOVERNMENTAL ACTION UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The position that there are extra-constitutional restraints
derives, of course, no support from those cases which sustain the
power of the courts to declare the invalidity of governmental ac-
tion which is clearly unconstitutional.
It is true that the Federal Constitution expressly forbids the
courts to enforce provisions of the state laws and the state consti-
tutions which conflict with the Federal Constitution, and that while
there is no provision of that Constitution which necessarily re-
quires the courts to decide for themselves whether federal legis-
lative or executive action is compatible with the Constitution,'
and while for some time there was room for doubt whether in the
absence of an express provision to that effect in a constitution a
court might refuse to enforce legislation which it considered clearly
in conflict with the constitution,' nevertheless, since the decision
4 Article VI, clause 2, which requires judges to ignore every provision of a'
state constitution or law which is in conflict with the supreme law of the land,
necessarily requires them to decide the question of compatibility before enforcing
the state constitution or law. But it does not seem that this clause either by
itself or in connection with any other clause necessarily requires the courts to
pass an independent judgment upon the compatibility of federal action to the
Constitution. See Thayer, John Marshall, 61, 64, 65, 98; book review by Prof.
Thayer in 7 Harv. L. Rev. 38o; Thayer, Origin and Scope of the American Doc-
trine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 137, note, reprinted in Thayer,
Legal Essays, x2, note. Compare Watson on the Constitution, 1168, 18o--1183,
1192; Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, viii, 67, 272 el seq.;
Meigs, Some Recent Attacks on the American Doctrine of Judicial Power, .4o
Am. L. Rev. 66o el seq.; Hastings, Is It Usurpation to Hold Void as Unconstitu-
tional Laws, 2o Green Bag, 453. Quaere, does "in pursuance thereof" mean
merely "as a consequence of the formation of the new government" and thus
assist in creating one obvious difference between laws and treaties or does it also
create an additional difference between laws and treaties? See also preceding
clause of Article VI; but compare Coxe, ubi supra, 316, as to the development of
this clause in the Convention; and see Meigs, ubi supra, 662. On the bearing
of other provisions of the Constitution see Corwin, The Establishment of Judi-
cial Review, 9 Mich. L. Rev. 102, 119; Corwin, The Supreme Court and Uncon.
stitutional Acts of Congress, 4 Mich. L. Rev. 616; Trickett, The Great Usurpa-
tion, 4o Am. L. Rev. 356; Pennoyer, The Income Tax Decision, 29 Am. L. Rev.
555, 859, 860.
' On the lack of unanimity on this subject about the time of the adoption
of the Federal Constitution see Corwin, The Supreme Court and Unconstitu-
tional Acts of Congress, 4 Mich. L. Rev. 616 el seq.; Corwin, The Establishment
of Judicial Review, 9 Mich. L. Rev. 1o2; Thayer, John Marshall, 63, 66, 72;
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
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in the case of Marbury v. Madison# it has been settled law that the
court may pass an independent judgment upon the constitution-
ality of legislation and refuse to enforce legislation which it con-
siders clearly unconstitutional:? the courts do not regard as strictly
binding upon them the interpretation which Congress must ne-
cessarily place upon grants of and restrictions upon legislative
power before it legislates, as do the courts of continental Europe.&
7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 132-134, 137, reprinted in Thayer, Legal Essays. t. 5-7,
zi; Willoughby on the Constitution, 5, 6; Beard. The Supreme Court and the
Constitution, Chap. 2, p. 113, note; Meigs, The Relation of the Judiciary to the
Constitution, ig Am. L. Rev. 175, 178 el seq.; Trickett, The Great Usurpation,
4o Am. L. Rev. 36o, 366; Trickett, Judicial Dispensation from Congressional
Statutes, 41 Am. L. Re,. 6 5; Coxe. Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legis-
lation, chaps. 2o-28; Meigs, Some Recent Attacks on th6 American Doctrine of
Judicial Power, 4o Am. L. Rev. 65o; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed.,
229, note; Federalist, No. 78; Pennoyer, The Income Tax Decision, 29 Am. L
Rev. 86o; An Early Constitutional Case in Massachusetts, 7 Harv. L Rev. 415;
Elliott, The Legislatures and the Courts, 5 Pol. Sci. Quar. 23t di seq.;.McClain,
Written and Unwritten Constitutions in the United States, 6 Col. L. Rev. 69,
70; Clark, The Supremacy of the Judiciary, 17 Harv. L Rev. 1; and see Pierce,
Federal Usurpation. 200, 201. On the popular attitude toward the courts see
also Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 132, note; 137, note, reprinted in Thayer, Legal Essays, 5,
zi; Bryce, American Commonwealth, 3d ed., 1, 501, 451-453; U; S. Consti-
tution, Amendments V-VIII; and see Thayer, John Marshall, 65, 66, 1o4, los ?
Bill of Rights (1688).
5(1803) 1 Cranch, 137.
7 The court in that case asserts a general right to refuse to enforce such legis-
lation, although the decision might have been based on a narrower ground. "As
this was a question of the constitutional grant of its own powers, it might have
assumed the right to ignore any attempted lessening or augmentating of them,
without claiming the larger right to interfere with the validity of acts of CongreLs
which did not pertain to its own jurisdiction:" Trickett, The Great Usurpation,
4o Am. L. Rev. 369. See also Ibid. 375; Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitu.
tional Legislation, 10, 20, 337; Thayer, John Marshall, 72 el seq.; BordweU, The
Function of the Judiciary, 7 Col. L. Rev. at 337; Corwin, The Establishment of
Judicial Review, 9 Mich. L. Rev. io2, 292; Beard, The Supreme Court and the
Constitution, 31, 33, 135, note.
'On the extent to which judges at times regard previous decisions of the
court upon constitutional questions as binding upon them see concurring opinion
in Dorr v. United States, (i9o4) z95 U. S. x38, 153,24 Sup. Ct. &oA, 814; Twining
v. New Jersey, (z9o8) 211 U. S. 78, 98, 99, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, z9; with which con-
sider Lincoln, Inaugural Address (i861); Legal Tender Cases, (z870) 12 Wali.
457; concurring opinions in Butchers' U. Co. v. Crescent C. Co., (1884) 111
U. S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct. 652; dissenting opinion in Abbott v. Beddingfield, (1899)
125 N. C. 256, 280, 34 S. E. 412, 419; Collins, The Fourteenth Amendment and
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GENERAL DUTY TO ENFORCE LEGISLATION
But the cases in which the court declares that it may pass
upon the constitutionality of the acts of other departments of
government themselves recognize the duty of the courts to enforce
legislation unless that legislation is, in the opinion of the dourts,s
unquestionably opposed to any view which may properly be taken
of the Constitution. * The courts have no general veto power
the States, chap. 8; Shroder, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis--Its Application to
Decisions Involving Constitutional Interpretation, 58 Cent. L J. 29; Machen,
The Elasticity of the Constitution, 14 Harv. L. Rev. 202, 2o6, 207, 2o9; Chamber.
lain, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis as Applied to Decisions of Constitutional
Questions, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 125; Willoughby on the Constitution, Sec. 28; Will-
oughby, The Supreme Court of the United States, 76, 77; and also Coudert,
Certainty and Justice, 14 Yale L. J. 364; Whitney, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis,
3 Mich. L. Rev. 89, 94 d seq., Ex parte Harding, (i9i) 219 U. S. 363, 378, 31
Sup. Ct. 324,329; Hertz v. Woodman, (1910) 218 U. S. 205, 212, 213, 30 Sup. Ct.
621, 622, 623; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. United States, (1911) 220 U. S. 559,
577, 31 Sup. Ct. 612, 66; Ex parte Holman, (1908) 79 S. C. 9, 13, 6o S. E. ig,
21; People v. Tompkins, (19o6) 186 N. Y. 413, 79 N. E. 326; Vail v. Arizona,
(9o7) 207 U. S. 201, 205, 28 Sup. Ct. 107, io8; dissenting opinion in Eakin v.
Raub, (1825) 12 S. & R. (Pa.) 330, 346; dissenting opinion in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, (1911) 221 U. S. i, 31 Sup. Ct. 5 02.-As to the formation of inde-
pendent opinions on constitutional questions see also Marbury v. Madison,
(I8o3) i Cranch, 137; Thayer, John Marshall, 67, 98, io8; Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev.
129, reprinted with additional notes in Thayer, Legal Essays; Corwin, The
Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Acts of Congress, 4 Mich. L. Rev. 629,
630; Trickett, The Great Usurpation, 40 Am. L. Rev. 374; Pennoyer, The In-
come Tax Decision, 29 Am. L. Rev. 557; Meigs, The Relation of the Judiciary
to the Constitution, 19 Am. L. Rev. z94-i99; dissenting opinion in Abbott v.
Beddingfield, (1899) 125 N. C. 256, 268, 272, 294, 34 S. E. 412, 415, 416, 424;
dissenting opinion in Eakin v. Raub, (z825) 12 S. & R. (Pa.) 330, 348, 351, 353,
356; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., 228; Bryce, American Common.
wealth, 3d ed., I, 244; 246, 268, 269; Pierce, Federal Usurpation, 20o. Theargu-
ment in Clark, The Supremacy of the Judiciary, 17 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 18, is en-
tirely unconvincing.
' See Corwin, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Acts of Congress,
4 Mich. L. Rev. 624; Trickett, Judicial Dispensation from Congressional Statutes,
4 Am. L. Rev. at 86, 87; dissenting opinion in Eakin v. Raub, (1825) 12 S. &
R. (Pa.) 330, 349. Compare Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, reprinted with additional
notes in Thayer, Legal Essays; Laurel H. C. v. San Francisco, (1910) 216 U. S.
358, 365, 31 Sup. Ct. 301, 302.
" See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 138 ef seg., reprinted in Thayer, Legal Essays; Thayer,
John Marshall, io6, io8, Iio; Bordwell, The Function of the Judiciary, 7 Col.
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over legislation." The Convention of 1787 'repeatedly and em-
phatically refused to place in the Constitution such a grant of
power to the courts,12 and it is inconceivable that those who adopted
the Constitution granted a similar power by implication.
PASSING UPON THE WISDOM OR JUSTICE OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIoN
The question of the propriety of legislation is not judicial in
its nature. That question has been entrusted to other departments
of-government. The Supreme Court has declared repeatedly that
it has no right to inquire into the wisdom or justice of acts by other
organs of the federal government or by the states or their organs
of governmenti and some of those statements have been made in
L. Rev. 337; Knoxville v. Knoxville W. Co., (1909) 212 U. S. z, 8, 16, 29 Sup. Ct.
148. xo, z53; Henderson B. Co. v. Henderson City, (1899) 173 U. S. 592, 6z,
19 Sup. Ct. 553, 562. On the extent to which this principle is observed by the
courts see ig Pol. Sci. Quar. 589; 21 Harv. L. Rev. 495, 499; Collins, The Four-
teenth Amendment and the States, 168-170.
"The opinion in Marbury v. Madison, (18o3) i Cranch, 137, so assumes.
See also Muskrat v. United States, (1911) 219 U. S. 346, 357, 31 Sup. Ct. 2So,
254; Elliot's Debates, V, 151. 344, 347; Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 136 d* seg., re.
printed in Thayer, Legal Essays. i, II e seq.; Thayer, John Marshall, chap. 5;
discussion in Dorman v. State, (1859) 34 Ala. 216, 232 d seq.; McMurtrie, The
Jurbidiction to Declare Void Acts of Legislation, .32 Am. L. Rev. N. S. Io94,
1095, 1 o3; McMurtrie, A Last Word on Constitutional Construction, 33 Am.
L. Reg. N. S. 506.
nSee note It, sufn'.
" See the especially strong language use i in McCray V. United States,
(1904) 195 U. S. 27, 54-61, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 776-778, in the many opinions there
quoted, and in Atkin v. Kansas, (z9o3) 191 U. S. 207, 223, 24 Sup. Ct. 124, 128;
and also Noble State Bank v. Haskell, (1911) 219 U. S. 575, 580, 31 Sup. Ct.
299, 300; Oceanic N. Co. v. Stranahan, (1909) 214 U. S. 320, 340, 29 Sup. Ct.
671,676; United States v. Delaware & H. Co., (19o9) 213 U. S. 366. 4o5, 29 Sup.
Ct. 527, 535; Twining v. New Jersey, (]9o8) 211 U. S. 78, 1o6, 29 Sup Ct. 14,22;
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, (197o) 207 U. S. i61, 176, 28 Sup. Ct. 40, 45; Lottery
Case-Champion v. Ames, (19o3) 188 U. S. 321, 363, 23 Sup. Ct. 321, 329, 330;
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, (19o2) z83 U. S. 5o3, 512, 22 Sup. Ct. 95,
99; New Y. & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, (1894) 151 U. S. 556, 57o, 14 Sup. Ct. 437,
441; Powell v. Pennsylvania, (i888) 127 U. S. 678, 686, 8 Sup. Ct. 992, 1257, 996;
Purity E. & T. Co. v. Lynch, (1912) 226 U. S. 192. 201, 33 Sup. Ct. 44, 46; Red
"C" O- M. Co. v. North Carolina, (1912) 222 U. S. 380, 394, 395, 32 Sup. Ct
152, 156; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., (1911z) 22o U. S. 107, 153, 154, 31 Sup. Ct.
342, 350; Brodnax v. Missouri, (1911) 219 U. S. 285, 293. 31 Sup. Ct. 238, 240;
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, (191o) 218 U. S. 57, 70, 30 Sup. Ct., 663,
667; District of Columbia v. Brooke, (1909) 214 U. S. 138, 150, 29 SUp. Ct. 560,
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS
language which was decidedly vigorous. And, indeed, even if
there were no constitutional objection to the making of such an
inquiry by the court, the inconvenience of leaving the validity of
563; Railroad Comn. of Louisiana v. Cumberland T. & T. Co., (19o) 212 U. S.
414, 420, 29 Sup. Ct. 357, 360; Wateis-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, (909) 212 U.
S. 159, 174, 29 Sup. Ct. 270, 274; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, (1908)
210 U. S. 281, 295, 28 Sup Ct. 616, 621; Armour P. Co. v. United States, (19o8)
209 U. S. 56, 82, 28 Sup. Ct. 428, 435; Sauer v. New York, (1907) 206 U. S. 536,
547, 27 Sup. Ct. 686, 689; Hennington v. Georgia, (1896) 163 U. S. 299, 304, 16
Sup. Ct. 1086, i88; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v: McGuire, (19T1) 219 U. S. S49,
569, 31 Sup. Ct. 259, 263; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, (19tt) 219 U. S.467, 474, 3 Sup. Ct. 265, 267; Ling Su Fan v. United States, (1910) 218 U. S.
302,311, 31 Sup. Ct. 21, 23; Grenada L. Co. v. Mississljpi, (1910) 217 U. S. 433,441, 30 Sup. Ct. 535, 539; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, <I91o) 217 U. S. 114,
127, 30 Sup. Ct. 496, 5o; Interstate Com. Comn. v. Illinois C. R. Co., (191o)
215 U. S. 452, 470, 30 Sup. Ct. 155, 16o; McLean v. Arkansas, (I909) 211 U. S.
539, 547, 548, 29 Sup. Ct. 206, 208; Employers' Liability Cases-Howard v.
Illinois C. R. Co., (1908) 207 U. S. 463, 492, 28 Sup. Ct. 141, 143; Heath & M.
M. Co. v. Worst, (1907) 207 U. S. 338, 357, 28 Sup. Ct. 114, 120; NVhitfield v.
Aetna L. I. Co., (1907) 205 U. S. 489, 495, 27 Sup. Ct. 578, 579; Patterson v.
Colorado, (1907) 205 U. S. 454, 46t, 27 Sup Ct. 556, 557; St. Mary's F. A. P.Co. v. %Vest Virginia, (19o6) 203 U. S. 183, 192, 27 Sup. Ct. 132, 135; Hooker v.
Los Angeles, (19o3) 188 U. S. 314, 320, 23 Sup. Ct. 395, 397; Patton v. Brady,
(1902) 184 U. S. 6o8, 623, 22 Sup. Ct. 493, 498; L'Hote v. New Orleans, (igoo)
177 U. S. 587, 597, 20 Sup. Ct. 791, 792; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, (19oo) 177 U. S.
190, 211, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 585; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, (19oo)
176 U. S. 167, 173, 20 Sup. Ct. 336. 338; Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, (1896)
164 U. S" 112, 157, 17 SOp. Ct. 56, 62; County of Mobile v. Kimball, (188o) 102
U. S. 69r, 704; Springer v. United States, (i88o) 3o2 U. S. 586, 594; Ex Pafl.
Siebold, (1879) too U. S. 371, 393; Legal Tender Cases, (1872) 12 Wall. 457,552; discussion in the case of Dorman v. State, (1859) 34 Ala. 216, 235; West
Virginia v. Dent, (1884) 25 W. Va. 1, 21; 22; Sedgwick, Construction of Statu-
tory and Constitutional Law, 2d ed., 154, 183 eL Seq.; 21 Harv. L. Rev. 495; 4
Harv. L. Rev. 386; 32 Am. L. Reg. N. S. .6, 596; 33 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 512; MC-
Murtrie, Observations on Mr. George Bancroft's Plea for the Constitution, pp.
5, 7,26; Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 3d ed., I, 253; and see Willoughby,
The Nature of the State, 77, 85; Blackstone, Commentaries, I, *g. Compare
19 Pol. Sci.*Quar. 589; 21 Harv. L. Rev. 495,499, Collins, The Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the States, 168-170, on the extent to which the principle is observed
by the courts; Interstate Com. Comn. v. Union P. Ry. Co., (1912) 222 U. S.
541, 547, 548, 32 Sup. Ct. 108, 1 i; Interstate Com. Comn. v. Illinois C. R. Co.
and McLean v. Arkansas, supra; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Powers, (i9o6) 201 U. S.
245, 300, 26 Sup. Ct. 459, 465; United States v. Joint T. Assn., (898) 171 U. S.
505, 571, 19 Sup. Ct. 25, .32; and opinion of Chase, J., in Calder v. Bull, (1798)
3 Dall. 386, 388. Justice Chase, it will be remembered, was a justice who left the
court without a quorum while he made political speeches, who even made such
a speech to a grand jury, and whose conduct in the Alien and Sedition case has
been severely criticized.
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a law in uncertainty for years and of allowing a court upon so in-
definite a ground"' to decide retroactively long after its enactment
that the law was void ab initio would constitute a very grave prac-
tical objection to such a course.'
Tm Nrm AmhNpmENr
Moreover, the declaration of the Ninth Amendment that "the
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people" merely
provides against an erroneous inference from other parts of the
Constititibn." It does not authorize courts to refuse to enforce
legislation pon the ground that Congress has violated rights
unnamed in the Constitution. And it has no bearing whatever
upon state legislation.
RULE STATED IN TWINING V. NEw JERSEY
But it is not necessary for us to go into a further consideration
of the authorities in support of this position. ' The court unques-
tionably declared correctly when it said in Twining v. New Jersey,"
"It must not be forgotten that in a free representative governiment
nothing is more fundamental than the right of the people through
their appointed servants to govern themselves in accordance with
t4 See McMurtrie, The Jurisdiction to Declare Void Acts of Legislation, 32
Am. L Reg. N. S. xzoS; with which compare Pollock, The Law of Reason, 2
Mich. L. Rev. '59, 373; Pollock, The Expansion of the Common Law, 4 Col. L
Rev. 171, 187.
" See McMurtrie, A Last Word on Constitutional Construction, 33 Am. V
Reg. N. S. 5", 512; McMurtrie, Note on Constitutional Law, 32 Am. L Reg*
N. S. 595; Trickett, The Great Usurpation, 40 Am. L. Rev. 362-365, 376; Norton
v. Shelby County, (1886) ti8 U. S. 425, 442, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 1125; Smalley,
Railroad Rate Control (Publications of the American Economic Assn.), ui4-
117; Knoxville v. Knoxville W. Co., (1909) 212 U. S. 1, 16, 29 Sup. Ct. 148, 15;
Collins, The Fourteenth Amendment and the States, 132, 136, 154, t58; Hadley,
The Eleventh Amendment, 66 Cent. L J. 71, 76; Ransom, Majority Rule and
the Judiciary, 62; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., 259; Bryce,
American Commonwealth, 3d ed., I, 250, 264; and also Thayer, John Marshall,
102 di seg., log. Compare McMurtrie, ubi supra, 33 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 5o7.
" See Annals of Congress, I, 456; Thorpe, Constitutional History of the
United States, I1, 218; The Federalist, No. 84; Story on the Constitution. sec.
44a
27 (19o8) 211 U. S. 78, xo6, 107, 29 SuP. Ct. 14, 22, 23. Compare expres.
sions in that opinion quoted in note 3, supj.
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their own will, except so far as they have restrained themselves by
constitutional limits specifically established, and that in our pe-
culiar dual form of government nothing is more fundamental than
the full power of the state to order its own affairs and govern its
own people, except so far as the Federal Constitution expressly
or by fair implication has withdrawn that power. The power of
the people of the states to make and alter their laws at pleasure
is the greatest security for liberty and justice, this court has said
in Hurtado v. California." We are not invested with the juris-
diction to pass upon the expediency, wisdom or justice of the laws
of the states as declared by their courts, but only to determine
their conformity with the Federal Constitution and the paramount
laws enacted pursuant to it. Under the guise of interpreting the
Constitution we must take care that we do not import into the dis-
cussion our own personal views of what would be wise, just and
fitting rules of government to be adopted by a free people and con-
found them with constitutional limitations. The question before
us is the meaning of a constitutional provision which forbids the
states to deny to any person due process of law. In the decision
of this question we have authority to take into account only those
fundamental rights which are expressed in that provision."
EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS AND RIGHTS
And yet in a number of other cases, as we have already pointed
out," there are expressions in favor of the recognition of extra-
constitutional restraints and rights. It is quite probable that there
is no case in which that position constitutes the only avowed
ground for the decision.0 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has
"(1884) 110 U. S. 516, 535, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 121.
See p. 441, supra.
"0 It may be remarked here that the doctrine of declaring legislative acts
void as being contrary to the constitution, was probably helped into existence
by a theory which found some favor among our ancestors at the time of the
Revolution, that courts might disregard such acts if they were contrary to the
fundamental maxims of morality, or, as it was phrased, to the laws of nature.
Such a doctrine was thought to have been asserted by English writers, and even
by judges at times, but was never acted on. It has been repeated here, as a
matter of speculation, by our earlier judges, and occasionally by later ones; but
in no case within my knowledge has it ever been enforced where it was the single
and necessary ground of the decision, nor can it be, unless as a revolutionary
measure:" Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Consti-
tutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 133, reprinted in Thayer, Legal Essays, I,
6, 7. See also notes to above passage.
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said recently that rarely if ever has it been unable to find some
remedy consistent with the law for acts which violated natural
justice.21 Yet the fact remains that in a number of instances the
court speaks of restraints and rights which, in view of the history
of some of the terms used and the conceptions involved in others of
the terms, are clearly considered as existing regardless of consti-
tutional provisions. And while the court upon some of those oc-
casions speaks of restraints and rights which it designates ii those
terms as supported by the constitutions, it does not'by the use of
such language show that consistency exists between the bagicide.
that there are extra-constitutionl restraints and rights- whichimayr
be enforced against all organs of government and the other basic
idea that some organs of government have all governmental powers
'.xcept those which are denied to them by the constitutions."
INALIENABLE RIGHTS
There are a few statements in approval of the theory of in-
alienable rights in opinions which are not very recent; n and even
21 "Suffice it to say, that the courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so
restrained by technical rules that they could not find some remedy, consistent
with the law, for acts, whether done by government or by individual persons,
that violated natural justice or were hostile to the fundamental principles devised
for the protection of the essential rights of property:" Monongahela B. Co. v.
United States, (91o) 216 U. S. 177, 195, 3o Sup. Ct. 356,361. See also Corwin,
The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Mich. L. Rev. 643,
where it is said, "Given a sufficient hardihood of purpose at the rack of exegesis,
and any document, no matter what its fortitude, will eventually give forth the
mcaning required of it;" and the language of Harlan, J., when orally announcing
his dissent from the decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, (i9ii) printed .
in 68 Legal Intelligencer, p. 318, col. 4. And see 24 Harv. L. Rev at 470. 471.
" In Cummings v. Missouri, (1866) 4 Wall. 277, which was decided before
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in which an ex postfacto law
was declared unconstitutional, the court said, speaking by Justice Field, that the
"theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that all men have certain
inalienable rights:" 4 Wall. at 321. But in the Slaughter House Cases, (1872)
16 Wall. 36, which were decided after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, while Justice Field reiterated his views concerning the existence of inalien-
able rights in a dissenting opinion in which three other justices concurred, (z6
Wall. at 96, 1o5, 1io, tit) those views were rejected by a majority of the court;
and in Butchers' U. Co. v. Crescent C. Co., (1884) tit U. S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct.
652, while similar views were expressed, (ii U. S. at 756, 757, 762, 4 Sup. Ct.
at 657, 66o) they were expressed only ifi opinions which concurred in the judg-
ment upon grounds which did not appeal to a majority of the court and the aco
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in some of the more recent cases there are casual dicta in which it
is assumed that there are inalienable rights.
NATURAL JUSTIcE, NATURAL RIGHTS
There are some mild expressions in several other opinions in
favor of judicial recognition of natural justice or natural rights
as possessing authority superior to legislation," although in still
other opinions such superiority is denied.
ceptance of which would have meant the overruling of the Slaughter House
decision. A statement from one of those "concurring" opinions in the Butchers'
Union case was, however, referred to with approval in the opinion of the court
in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, (1897 )165 U. S. 578, 589, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 43!. And
see Corwin, The Doctiine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 Harv.
L Rev. 36b, 375; with which compart Satterlep- v. Matthewson, (1829) 2 Pet.
380, 413, 414-
2 Frisbie v. United States, (1895) 157 U. S. 16o, 165, 15 Sup. Ct. 586, 588;
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, (1905) 197 U. S. 11, 29, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 362; Twin-
ing v. New Jersey, (x9o8) 211 U. S. 78, 1o6, 110, 113, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 22, 24,25.
See also 211 U. S. at ioi, 102, 29 Sup. Ct. at 20, 2t, quoted in note 3, on p. 442,
supra. Compare discussion on p. 456, infra.
" Dicta in Holden v. Hardy, (1898) 169 U. S. 366, 390, 18 Sup. Ct. 383,
387; Turpin v. Lemon, (1902) 187 U. S. 51, 57, 60, 23 Slp. Ct. 20, 23, 24; Arndt
v. Griggs, (189o) 134 U. S. 316, 321, 10 Sup. Ct. 557, 559, of which the passage
last cited may possibly express the thought, on which we shall not now comment,
that specific provisions of the Constitution will be enforced literally but that a
provision which the court considers less definite will be applied only against
governmental actions which the court considers to be against natural justice.
See also Monongahela B. Co. v. United States, (igiO) 216 U. S. 177, 195, 30
Sup. Ct. 356. 361; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, (1897) 166 U. S. 226, 236,
17 Sup. Ct. 58t, 584; Hurtado v. California, (Ib84) 110 U. S. 516, 535, 4 Sup.
Ct. IIT, 292, l2o; License Tax Cases, (1866) 5 Wall. 462, 469; Terrett v. Taylor,
(I815) 9 Crafich, 43, 52; language of Chase, J., in Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3 Dalil.
386, 388; dissenting opinion in Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. People, (1906) 200
U. S. 561, 598. 599, 26 Sup. Ct. 341, 352; dissenting opinion in Slaughter House
Cases. (1872 )I6 Wall. 36, 96; "concurring" opinion in Butchers' U. Co.v. Cres-
scent C. Co., (1884) ii U. S. 746, 754,4 Sup Ct. 652,659.
'5 New Y. & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, (1894) 151 U. S. 556, 570, 14 Sup. Ct.
437, 441. And see language of Iredell, J., in Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3 Dal. 386,
398, 399; Elliot's Debates, V, 344 el seg.; dissenting opinion in Loan Assn. v.
Topeka, (1875) 20 Wall. 655. 68; language of author of opinion in Loan Assn.
v. Topeka in dissenting opinion in Hepburn v. Griswold, (1869) 8 Vall. 603,
638, (the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold from which he dissented was over-
ruled in the Legal Tender Cases, (1870) 12 Wall. 457, and the decision which he
announced in Loan Assn. v. Topeka %Nas somewhat explained by him in David.
son v. New Orleans, (1877) 96 U. S. 97, 105); quotation in note 20, supra; Hed-
derich v. State, (1885) Tor Ind. 564, 566. 1 N. E. 47; Dorman v. State, (1859)
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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
In cases which arose after the Spanish war there are sugges-
tions that, while some of the provisions of the Federal Constitu-
tion are not in force in territory which is subject to the federal
government but which has not been "incorporated" into the United
States, yet in such territory even "where there is no direct command
of the Constitution which applies, there may nevertheless be re-
strictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be trans-
gressed, although not expressed in so many words in the Consti-
tution.".
34 Ala. 216, 232 d* seg.; Black, Constitutional Law, 3d ed., p. 72; Dec. Dig.,
Const. Law, sec. 39; Bryce, American Commonwealth, 3d ed., I, 447; Patterson,
The United States and the States Under the Constitution, 2d ed., p. io; Suther-
land, Statutory Construction, 2d ed., ac. 85; Cooley, Constitutional Limita-
tions, 7th ed., 233; Sedgwick, Construction of Statutory and Constitutional
Law, 2d ed., 154-159; McMurtrie, The Jurisdiction to Declare Void Acts of Legis-
lation, 32 Am. L. Reg. N. S. sio8; McMurtrie, A Last Word on Constitutional
Construction, 33 Am. L. Reg. N. S. .-- On the theory of natural justice see also
note 32, infra.
""Whilst, therefore, there is no express or implied limitation on Congress
in exercising its power to create local gove-nments for any and all of the teri-
tories, by which that body is restrained from the widest latitude of discretion.
it does not follow that there may not be inherent, though unexpressed, principles
which are the basis of all free government which cannot be with impunity traims
cended. But this does not suggest that every express limitation of the Consti-
tution which is applicable has not force, but only signifies that even in cases
where there is no direct command of the Constitution which applies, there may
nevertheless be restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be trans-
gressed, although not expressed in so many words in the Constitution:" from
separate opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, (i9ot) 182 U. S. 244, 290, 291, 21 Sup.
Ct. 770, 788, by White, J., in which Shiras and McKenna, JJ., concurred and with
which Gray, J., agreed in substance The above language was quoted with ap-
parent approval by Day, J., in the opinion of the court in Dorr v. United States,
(19o4) 195 U. S. 138, 147, 24 Sup. Ct. 8o8, 812. The statement of Bradley, J.
in the Mormon Church Case-Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ v.
United States, (189o) 536 U. S. 1, 44, 1o Sup. Ct. 792, 8o3, that "Doubtless
Congress, in legislating for the Territories would be subject to those fundamental
limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated in the Constitution
and its Amendments; but these limitations would exist rather by inference and
the general spirit of the Constitution from which Congress derives all its powers,
than by any express and direct application of its provisions," is quoted with ap-
proval by Brown, J., in his separate opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, (igos) 182
U. S. 244, 268, 21 Sup. Ct. 770, 780, and is also quoted in the opinion of the court
in Dorr v. United States, (z9o4) 195 U. S. 138, 146, 24 Sup. Ct. 8o8, 812. See
also opinion of the court in Dorr v. United States, (x9o4) 195 U. S. 138, 148, 24
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And in other cases which arose in territory which is unques-
tionably part of the United States there are expressions of which
the precise meaning is doubtful but which may indicate the posi-
tion that "fundamental rights" are as such -inviolable r although
Sup. Ct. 8o8, 812; separate opinions of Brown, J., in Hawaii v. Mankichi, (x9o3)
190 U. S. 197, 218, 23 Sup. Ct. 787, 791; Downes v. Bidwell, (1901) 182 U. S.
244, 282, 21 Sup. Ct. 770, 785; and opinion of court in Knowlton v. Moore,
(19oo) 178 U. S. 41, 109, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 774, quoted in opinion last cited. Con-
sider, however, the vigorous criticisms of the views expressed above in McClain,
Written and Unwritten Constitutions in the United States, 6 Col. L. Rev. 69.
73, 79, 80; Patterson. The United States and the States Under the Constitution.
2d ed.. p. io; Pierce, Federal Usurpation, 228 el seq.; Campbell v. Jackman Bros.
(1908) 140 Iowa, 475, 1x8 N. ,V- 755; Ward L. Co. v. Henderson-White M. 
Co.,
(1907) 107 Va. 626, 59 S. .476.
"? In United States v. Cruikshank, (1875) 92 U. S. 542, 554, the court said
that the Fourteenth Amendment "simply furnishes an additional guaranty
against any encroachment by the states upon the fundamental rights which
belong to every citizen as a member of society." But this was a mere dictum.
In Knowlton v. Moore, (19oo) 178 U. S. 41, 109, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 774, the court'
mentioned the contention that it could apply "inherent and fundamental prin-
ciples for the protection of the individual, even though there be no express au-
thority in the Constitution to dolso," but said that the facts of the case were not
such as to require the court to consider that contention. In Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, (1884) xio U. S. 5x6, 534, 535, 4 Sup. Ct. II!, 292, 120, the court said
that the provision for due process of law in the Fifth Amendment "refers to that
law of the land -which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred
upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the
limits therein prescribed, and interpreted according to the principles of the com-
mon law. In the Fourteenth Amendment, by parity of reasoning, it refers to
that law of the land in each state, which derives its authority from the inherent
and reserved powers of the state, exerted within the limits of those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions, and the greatest security for which resides in the right of the people
to make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure." A large part of this
statement is repeated in In re Kemmler, (189o) 136 U. S. 436, 448, io Sup. Ct.
930, 934, and part of it which relates to the Fourteenth Amendment is repeated in
Twining v. New Jersey, (i9o8) 211 U. S. 78, 102, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 21, in such a
connection that it is quite possible that it is given a meaning different from that
which was originally intended. In other portions of the opinion in the Hurtado
case the court as3umed, as it has often done, that the provision for due process of
law, standing alone, ha'the same meaning in both the Fifth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment, and in the passage quoted the court uses the expression
"by parity of reason." It is, therefore, quite probable that the court referred to
"the fundamental principles of liberty and justice" merely for rhetorical effect
and thai it did not seriously intend to declare that the provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment possesses a scope wider than that which the court in the passage
quoted declares to be the scope of the provision in the Fifth Amendment. In
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from the language used in still other opinions it seems quite possible
that usually if not always when the court says that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects fundamental rights it means merely that in
interpreting provisions which are couched in general language it
may regard the maxim "de minimis non curat lex.""
Howard v. Kentucky, (19o6) 200 U. S. 164, 173, 26 Sup. Ct. 189, 191, the court
said, "It may be admitted that the words 'due process of law,' as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, protect fundamental rights." See also American L. Co.
v. Zeiss, (1911) 219 U. S. 47, 66, 31 Sup. Ct. 200, 207; Carroll v. Greenwich I.
Co., (19O5) 199 U. S. 401, 410, 26 Sup. Ct. 66, 67. Backus v. Fort S. U. D. Co.,
(1898) 169 U. S. 557, 576, 18 Sup. Ct. 445, 452; Twining v. New Jersey, (1908)
211 U. S. 78, 101, 102, zo6, 110, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 20, 22, 24 (with which compare
211 U. S. at 107, 29 Sup. Ct. at 23); the concession simply for argument in Mc-
Cray v. United States, (1904) 195 U. S. 27. 63, 64, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 779, 780;
soconcurring" opinion in Butchers' U. Co. v. Crescent C. Co., (1884) I1 U. S.
746, 759, 4 Sup Ct. 652, 661, 662; dissenting opinions in Slaughter House Cases,
(1872) i6 Wall. 36, 87, 95, io6, 14, ii6.
' In Watson v. Maryland, (1910) 218 U. S. 173, 177, 30 Sup. Ct. 644, 646,
the court said, "The federal courts can only interfere when fundamental rights.
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution are violated in the enactment of such
statutes." In Ballard v. Hunter, (I9o7) 204 U. S. 241, 262, 27 Sup. Ct. 26t,
269, it said, "The laws of a state come under the prohibition of the Fourteenth
Amendment only when they infringe fundamental rights. A law must be framed
and judged of in consideration of the practical affairs of man." In Rogers v.
Peck, (1905) 199 U. S. 425, 434, 26 Sup. Ct.- 87, 89, the court said, "It is only
where fundamental rights, specially secured by the Federal Constitution, are
invaded, that such interference is warranted," and this position was cited in
Franklin v. South Carolina, (1910) 218 U. S. 161, i65, 30 Sup. Ct. 64o, 641. In
Brown v. New Jersey, (1899) 175 U. S. 172, 175, 20 Sup. Ct. 77, 78, the court
said that the state has full control over the procedure in its courts both in cvii
and criminal cases, "subject only to the qualification that such procedure must
not work a denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applicable
provisions of the Federal Constitution," and this statement was repeated with
approval in West v. Louisiana, (1904) 194 U. S. 258, 263, 24 Sup. Ct. 65o, 652;
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, (1909) 212 U. S. 86, 107, 29 Sup. Ct. 220, 225.
If the language just quoted may be interpreted as suggested in the text, no ob-
jection can be made to the position of the court, but the expressions in those
opinions are quite objectionable if they are on a par with the suggestions con-
tained in the dicta in Lawton v. Steele, (1894) 152 U. S. 133, 140, 14 Sup. Ct.
499, 502, that "An act of the legislature which has for its object the preservation
of the public interests against the illegal depredations of private individuals
ought to be sustained, unless it is plainly violative of the Constitution or sub-
versive of private rights," and in Halter v. Nebraska, (19o7) 205. U. S. 34, 45,
27 Sup. Ct. 419, 423, that "It would be going very far to say that the statute in
question had no reasonable connection with the common good and was not pro-
motive of the peace, order and well-being of the people. Before this court can
hold the statute void it must say that and, in addition, adjudge that it violates
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"ESSENTIAL NATURE OF ALL FREE GOVERNMENTS."
The court has also said that upon all organs of government
there are limitations "which grow out of the essential nature of all
free governments. "n
rights secured by the Constitution of the United States. We cannot so say and
cannot so adjudge;" and with the language of Field, J., dissenting, in Slaughter
House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. 36, 87.-On the subject of this note in general see
also other statements in West v. Louisiana, (19o4) 194 U. S. 258, 263, 24 Sup. Ct.
65o, 652; and also Allen v. Georgia, (1897) 166 U. S. 138, 140, 141, 17 Sup. Ct.
525, 526; Wilson v. North Carolina, (1898) 169 U. S. 586, 594, 18 Sup. Ct. 435,
438.
" Madisonville T. Co. v. St. Bernard M. Co., (igo5) z96 U. S. 239, 251,
252, 25 Sup. Ct. 251, 256; Loan Assn. v. Topeka, (1874) 20 Wall. 655, 662, 663
(where the declaration was made in spite of an able and unanswerable dissenting
opinion from Clifford, J.; see also the language of the author of the opinion in
Loan Assn. v. Topeka in dissenting opinion in Hepburn v. Griswold, (869) .8
Wall. 603, 638; the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold from which he dissented
was overruled in the Legal Tender Cases, (1870) 12 Wall. 457, and the decision
which he announced in Loan Assn. v. Topeka was somewhat explained by him in
Davidson v. New Orleans, (877) 96 U. S. 97, 105). See also Terrett v. Taylor,
(1815) 9 Cranch, 43, 50, 51, 52, a case which, it will be noted, came from a lower
federal court and not from a state court, but where the opinion should have re-
ferred simply to the impairment of contract clause; dictum in Holden v. Hardy,
(1898) 169 U. S. 366, 389, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 387; the concession simply for argu-
ment in McCray v. United States, (904) 195 U. S. 27, 63, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 779;
suggestion in Giozza v. Tiernan, (1893) 148 U. S. 657, 661, 13 Sup. Ct. 721, 723
(with which suggestion compare language of author of that opinion in McPherson
v. Blacker, (1892) 146 U. S. 1, 25, 13 Sup. Ct. 3, 7; New Y. & N. E. R. Co. v.
Bristol, (1894) 151 U. S. 556. 570, 14 Sup. Ct. 437, 441); dictum in Hurtado v.
California, (1893) n1o U. S. 516, 535, 4 Sup. Ct. 11I, 292, 120, (discussed in note
27, supra); dictum in Wilkinson v. Leland, (1829) 2 Pet. 627, 656-658; separate
opinion of Chase, J., in Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3 DalI. 386, 388; sfikgestion in
Fletcher v. Peck, (81o) 6 Cranch, 87, 135, 136. The suggestion last cited is
explained in Satterlee v. Matthewson, (1829) 2 Pet. 380, 413, 414, where, after
saying that a state law which divested rights which had been vested by law, but
which did not impair the obligation of any contract, would not violate the Con-
stitution of the United States, the court pointed out that the suggestion in
Fletcher v. Peck must be considered simply as relating to the state constitu-
tion, which the court might interpret in a case which like Fletcher v. Peck, came
to it from a federal court and not from a state court.-With the citations in this
note compare language of Iredell, J., in Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3 DalI. 386, 398;
Dorman v. State, (1859) 34 Ala. 216, 232 ef seq.: Black, Constitutional Law, 3d.
ed., p. 72, 2d ed., pp. 63, 64; Patterson, The United States and the States Under
the Constitution, 2d ed., p. io; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed.,
237-239; McClain, Unwritten Constitutions in the United States, 15 Harv. L.
Rev. 531; Story on the Constitution, 5th ed., II, 568, note; Dale, Implied Limi-
tations Upon Legislative Power, 24 Am. Bar Assn. Proc. 294, 315-319.-There is
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DISCUSSION ON INALIENABLE RIGHTS, ETC.
The statements concerning inalienable rights to which we
have referred follow the language of a broad assertion of general
principle which is made at the outset of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. But the assertion of such a general principle in the
Declaration of Independence does not show that the courts may
declare that legislation is void because it violates what the courts
may determine to be inalienable rights, for the Declaration is not
part of the Constitution of the United States,* and even if it were
part of that Constitution it would be going far to say that the general
statement of the Declaration of Independence that men possess
inalienable rights should be given a weight which the court refusese
to give to the general statements in the- Preamble to that Consti-
tution which was framed in 1787. The statements concerning
inalienable rights are, therefore, in the same category as those
concerning, natural justice, those concerning the possession of
fundamental rights which are not expresed in the constitutions
and those concerning rights which are said to grow out of the es-
sential nature of all free governments.
As to all such statements it is sufficient to say that the pre-
mises upon which they are based have been abandoned by thought-
a dictum in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, (i9o5) 197 U. S. i, 29, 25 Sup. Ct. 358,
362, that "there is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the
supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human
government, especially of any free government existing under a written consti-
tution, to interfere with th.- exercise of that will." But, of course, it cannot be
successfully contended that in all fre. governments in which there are written
constitutions che courts may interfere to enforce the provisions of those consti-
tutions. And even in the United States, where the courts do enforce, with some
exceptions, the provisions of the written constitutions, the mere fact that a con-
stitution is written is immaterial apart from the contents of that consaitution,
unless, indeed, we may say that "given A sufficient hardihood of purpose at the
rack rf exegesis, and any document, no matter what Its fortitude, will even-
tually give forth the meaning required of it:" 7 Mich. L Rev. 643.
"Yet the language of Bradley, J., dissenting, in Slaughter House Casts.
(z872) z6 Wall. 36, 120; concurring in Butchers' U. Co. v. Crescent C. Co..
(1884) Ii U. S. 746, 762, 4 Sup. Ct. 652,657. suggests that it was hs opinion that
our modern legislative bodies are restrained even by some of the old English
statutes. Compare Beard, The Supreme Court and the Constitution, chap. 4,
as showing the relation of the Constitution to the Declaration of Independence.
A Jacobsoa v. Mamchusetts, (59o5) 197 U. S. 11, 22, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 9.
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ful men for over a century," that those statements are against
the vast weight of direct authority; and that the court has not
attempted to support them by any discussion of pxjnciple.
Robert P. Reeder.
PhAidelphia, March z93.
* On the theory of natural justice see note 15 supra, and Lee v. Bude & T.
I. Ry. Co., (1871) L. R. 6 C. P. 576, 582; Dicey, The Law of the Constitution
7th ed., 59; Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, zoth ed., 36,37; Huxley, Methods
and Results Essays, essay entitled Natural Rights and Political Rights;
Ritchie, Natural Rights; Salmond, The Law of Nature; II Law Quar. Rev. 121,
Bryce, Studies in History and Juriiprudene, I, essay entitled "The Law of
Nature;" Polhc, The Expansion of the Common Law, 1o, 121; Pollock, The
History of the Law of Nature, I Col. L. Rev. 17, 2 Col. L Rev. 131; Pollock's
Maine's Ancient Law, chap. 3; Pollock, The Law of Reason, 2 Mich. L. Rev.
at 168, z69; book reviews, 26 Law Quar. Rev. z73, x67, z68; Willoughby, The
Nature of the State, chap. 5; Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review, 9
Mich. L Rev 102, 1IS, 306. Consider also the discussion In Pound, Common
Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383.
